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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Alan N. Resnick*'

EXPIRATION OF LETTER OF
CREDIT AFTER PAYMENT LEAVES
CREDITOR VULNERABLE TO
PREFERENCE RISK

Can an unsecured creditor be better
off when the debtor defaults rather
than paying off the debt? Yes: Law
can be stranger than fiction in the
Preference Zone.

This is how Circuit Judge Alex
Kozinski began his majority opinion
for the Court of App~ls in In re
Poweline Oil Company,' in which
the Ninth Circuit provided an important lesson for creditor beneficiaries ofletters of credit, guarantees,
and other third-party surety arrangements: It is risky to rely on a
letter of credit if it may expire after
direct payment of the underlying
debt without providing for recourse
against the issuer in the event that
the creditor-beneficiary is required
to disgorge payment as a voidable
preference, especially if the issuer's
contingent reimbursement right
against the debtor may become less
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59 F3d 969 (9th Cir. 1995).
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than fully secured. Failure to heed
this advice could result in the creditor having to repay at least a portion
of the amount received from the
debtor as a voidable preference
without having the protection
against the debtor's insolvency that
the letter of credit or guarantee was
intended to provide.
The Facts
When Koch Oil Company agreed
to sell crude oil to Powerline Oil
Company, Koch was m,tmed as beneficiary of two irrevocable standby
letters of credit issued by First National Bank of Chicago for the purpose of securing Powerline's obligations. The letters of credit, which
were due to expire in April 1984,
were issued in connection with a
$250 million line of credit extended
to Powerline by a syndicate consisting of se.verall>anks and insurance compa,nies. The line of credit
was secured by a security interest
on most of Powerline's personal
property. First National Bank of
Chicago was one of the lenders covered by the security agreement. The
$8.7 million aggregate amount of
the two letters of credit was at alt'
times sufficient to cover the price
of the oil sold to Powerline.
In early 1984, Powerline paid
Koch $8.5 million for oil deliveries.
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Unfortunately for Koch, Powerline
flled a Chapter 11 petition within
ninety days after such payments.
Even more unfortunate was thatafter the letters of credit had expired
by their own terms-the Creditors'
Committee initiated a voidable preference action against Koch to recover $3.2 million of the $8.5 million
of payments. The reason for seeking
the return of $3.2 million was that
such payments were made more
than the forty-five days after the
delivery of oil, which, according to
the version of the Bankruptcy Code
in effect at that time, took those
payments out of the "ordinary
course of business'' exception to the
preference provision. 2
Bankruptcy Court Protects Koch
In the bankruptcy court, Koch
was successful in obtaining summary judgment in its favor based on
th~ so-called ''contemporaneous
exchange for new value exception''
to the voidable preference provision. That is, under Section
547(c)(l) of the Bankruptcy Code,
a transfer is not voidable to the
extent that it was "intended by the
debtor and the creditor to or for
whose benefit such transfer was
made to be a contemporaneous
exchange for new value given to
2
See 11 USC § 547(c)(2), which contains the "ordinary course of business" exception to the preference provision of the
Bankruptcy Code. Prior to a 1984 amendment to§ 547(c)(2), the exception· applied
only if the preferential payment was made
within forty-five days after the date on which
the debt was incurred. The forty-five day
limitation was removed in 1984.

the debtor" and was "in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange.' ' 3 Since the voidable preference provision of the Code found
in Section 547(b) Is generally aimed
at avoiding transfers of the debtor's
assets on the eve of bankruptcy that
unduly benefit one creditor over
others, the "contemporaneous exchange for new value exception''
recognizes that the policy behind
the preference provision does not
apply to prebankruptcy transfers
that do not result in a depletion of
the debtor's estate.
Courts have held that the "contemporaneous exchange for new
value exception'' applies when payment to a fully secured lender in
satisfaction of an antecedent debt
results in a release of the lien on the
debtor's property. In essence, if a
$10 million debt is paid that results
in the removal of a $10 million lien
on the debtor's assets, such payment
has no adyerse impact on the value
of the debtor's estate and the corresponding distribution to unsecured
creditors in the event of the debtor's
liquidation. This principle also has
been applied where the creditor is
itself unsecured, but is the beneficiary of a letter of credit or guarantee and the letter of credit issuer or
guarantor has a reimbursement right
against the debtor that is secured by
a lien on the debtor's assets. For
example, in In re Fuel Oil Supply &
Terminaling, Inc. ,4 the debtor paid
an unsecured creditor within the
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11 USC§ 547(c)(1).
837 F2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988).
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ninety-day preference period. Mow- than such creditor would receive
ever, since the creditor was the ben- if-(A) the case were a case under
eficiary of letters of credit issued by chapter 7 of [the Bankruptcy Code];
banks that had security interests in (B) the transfer had not been made;
the debtor's property that exceeded and (C) such creditor received paythe amount of the debtor's obliga- ment of such debt to the extent protions to the unsecured creditor, and vided. by the provisions of this tithe result of the debtor's direct pay~ tle. " 6 The BAP concluded that,
ment to the unsecured creditor was even if the $3.2 million payment
the release of the bank's lien on had not .been made;it would have
the debtor's property, the Court of been paid in full by drawing on the
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held letters of creditor.
that the payment was a contemporaThe BAP itself appeared to have
neous exchange for new value pro- recognized that a literal or traditiontected under Section 547(c)(l). al application of Section 547(b)(5)
"[T]he release of the debtor's col- ma:Y not have saved Koch from the
lateral offsets the transfer to the preference attack. Courts have apcreditor' thereby resulting in no plied that subsection by measuring
depletion to the debtor's estate. " 5
what the creditor received as a preBased on this reasoning, the bankruptcy payment against what
bankruptcy court agreed with Koch the creditor would have received
that the exception for COI).tempora- from the bankruptcy estate if the
neous exchanges under Section payment had not been made and
547(c)(l) was applicable to the $3.2 the debtor had filed a Chapter 7
million payment made by Pow- petition. For example, if in a hypo•
erline, which had the simultaneous thetical Chapter 7 case, the creditor
effect of releasing the bank's lien would receive a distribution from
on Powerline' s personal property.
the debtor's estate of only 50 percent of its claim, the full payment
Appeal to the BAP
of the claim during the ninety-day
The bankruptcy appellate panel preference period enables the crediaffirmed the bankruptcy court's tor to receive more than it would
summary judgment, but on a differ- have received under the provisions
ent ground. The BAP reasoned that of the Code-regardless of whether
the $3.2 million payments did not the creditor has a right to receive
satisfy one of the elements of a pref- additional payment from a third parerence spelled out in· Section ty. The fact that a debt is guaranteed
547(b)(5) of the Code. That element by a solvent third party is irrelevant
requires that, to be a voidable pref- in determining whether the prefer,erence, the subject transfer must ential payment enabled the creditor
enable the creditor to receive' 'more to receive more than it would have
6

s 837 F2d at 228.
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received .from the debtor's Chapter
7 estate. As the Fourth Circuit wrote
in In re Virginia-Carolina Financial
Corp., the relevant inquiry under
Section 547(b)(5) focuses "not on
whether a creditor may have recovered all of the monies owed by the
debtor from any source whatsoever,
but instead upon whether the creditor would have received less than
100% payout" from the debtor's
estate. 7
Although the fact that Koch had
recourse against First National
Bank on the letters of credit at the
time it received payment from Powerline should have been irrelevant
in determining whether the $3 .2
million payment was voidable as a
preference, the BAP-based on a
rule of reason designed to avoid an
inequitable result-carved out a new
exception to the general rule that
recourse against third parties has no
bearing on the application of Section
547(b)(5). The BAP held that the
presence of a letter of credit could
be taken into account in applying
Section 547(b)(5), but only if it expires after the payment was made
and before the preference litigation.
Otherwise, the application of the
Bankruptcy Code would produce
the inequitable result of placing
Koch in a much worse position.
merely because Powerline paid its
debt rather than having defaulted at
a time when Koch could have drawn
on the letters of credit.
The BAP wrote that a creditor's
rights against a surety ''are not rele7

954 F2d 193, 199 (4th Cir. 1992).

vant to whether a transfer is preferential so long as those rights are still
in place after the preference action
is commenced .... [But] when that
right of action against the surety no
longer exists, it is incumbent upon
the court to measure the net recovery that the transferee would have
obtained from the surety had the
transfer not been made.' ' 8
The Ninth Circuit Reverses
The court of appeals found fault
with the holdings and reasoning
bf both the bankruptcy court and
the BAP. With respect to the "contemporaneous exchange for new
value exception" under Section
547(c)(l), thecourtofappealsnoted
that those cases that have recognized
that payment to an unsecured creditor is not a voidable preference if it
results in the release of a security
interest on the debtor's property
held by the issuer of a letter of
credit, such as the Fuel Oil Supply
& Tenninaling case mentioned previously, involved situations in
which the issuer was fully secured so
that payment to the creditor released
collateral of the same value. In contrast, at the time of the $3.2 million
payment to Koch, First National
Bank's contingent reimbursement
claim against Powerline was only
partially secured. Powerline had
$282 million in total secured debt
at the time, but the value of the
collateral securing that debt was
only $66 million. In addition, First
8 Quoted by the Court of Appeals, 59
F3d at 972-973.
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National did not even have a first
lien on those assets above the rights
of other lenders because, under the
agreement with the syndicate of
banks and insurance companies that
provided the line of credit, all secured lenders agreed to share equally in the collateral. Therefore, only
a portion of First National Bank's
contingent reimbursement claim
against Powerline was secured by
Powerline's assets.
When Powerline made the $3.2
m\llion payment, it had. the effect Qf
releasing First N~tional's lien, bu~
only to the extent that the claim was
secured. "Thus," the court noted,
"Powerline received. new value
equal to the amount of the secured
portion of First National's reimbursement claim.' ' 9 But with respect to the unsecured part of the
bank's contingent reimbursement
claim, the court stated that "Powerline didn't receive new value; the
bank couldn't release a security interest in Poweline's assets it didn't
have. . . . The contemporaneous
exchange for new value exception
therefore doesn't protect Koch's
$3.2 million paxment to the extent
First National's reimbursement
claim was unsecured.'' 10 Because
the court of ~ppeals ~ould not determine from the record the amount by
which First National Bank's contingent reimbursement claim against
Powerline was uns~cured, the proceeding ,was remanded to the bankruptcy coqrt for that determination. .
9
10
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To the extent that the bank's reimclaim was unsecured,
that portion of the $3.2 million payment would not be protected by the
contemporaneous exchange for new
value exception.
bursem~nt

Rejecting the·BAP's "Rule of
Reason"
The court of appeals also rejected
the BAP's application of Section
547(b)(5). The BAP applied that
subsection in a manner that protected Koch from the preference attack
because, had the $3.2 mili_on payment not been made, Koch would
have been able to draw on the letters
of credit that are no longer in existence. Now that the letters of credit
had expired, recovering the payment as a preference would leave
Koch unprotected. Clearly, the
BAP was attempting to achieve a
fair and reaspnable result, despite
the fact that under prevailing case
law the availability of a surety, letter
of credit, or other third party codebtor is irrelevant when ;applying
Section 547(b)(5). According to the
court of appeals, "The BAP cited
no authority for this proposition and
we construe it to have been an exercise of its ~quitable powers." i 1 '
Recognizing that bankruptcy
courts "are sometimes referred to
as courts of equity,,'' 12 the court of
appeals emphasized the limits of the
bankruptcy court's equitable powers. It ~aid:
11

59 F3d at 973.
59 F3d at 973-974.

12
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Equity may not be invoked to defeat
clea{ statutory language, nor to reach
results inconsistent with the statutory
scheme established by the Code. . ..
Be~ause the statutory language here
provides no basis for the BAP' s "rule
of reason,'' we conclude that it was
error to consider the right to draw on
third-party letters of credit in deciding whether Koch had received a
preference. 13

The dissenting judge in Powerline did not agree with the majority's reading of Section 547(b)(5)
and stated:
The plain language of the statute 'does
not limit consideration to funds from
Powerline's estate. Under a hypo'thetical chapter·7liquidation, it could
have collected ffom First National as
•'provided by the provisions of this
title." In its opinion, the BAP ruled
that '' [n]othing in title 11 would prevent a draw down on the credits here
at issue had Powerline filed bankruptcy without paying Koch.''
In my opinion, the BAP's decision
does not avoid the plain language of
section 547(b)(5). 14

Conclusion.
Although it is easy to see how the
BAP could sympathize with Koch,
the Ninth Circuit's decision is
sound-both as·a matter of statutory
construction and as a policy matter.
Because First National Bank's reimbursement obligation was undersecured, the result of the $3.2 million
payment to Koch during the prefer13
14

ld.
59 F3d at 974.

ence period was removal of an encumbrance on less than $3.2 million
worth ofPowerline' s property. That
is, Powerline's payment produced a
net reduction in the value of Powerline's estate that was available to
unsecured creditors in the bankruptcy case, while giving Koch a 100
percent recovery on its unsecured
claim at a time when Powerline was
insolvent.
In addition, the payment clearly
gave Koch more than it would have
received from Powerline's estate if
therv had been a Chapter 7 liquidation and no prebankruptcy $3.2 million payment. The availability of
other sources of payment,, such as
a third-party guaranty or letter or
credit, should not be relevant in
determining whether the payment .
was a preference-whether or not
the guaranty or letter of credit had
expired. Otherwise, an insolvent
debtor would be free to pay favorite
unsecured creditors immediately
before bankruptcy, thus depriving
other unsecured creditors of available assets from which to make a
distribution, merely because the favorite creditors had third-party
guarantees.
The strange lesson to be learned
from Powerline is that, as Judge
Kozinski has warned, in the Preference Zone an unsecured creditor
may be better off when the debtor
defaults rather than paying off the
debt. In more practical terms, it is
risky .to rely on a letter of creditor any other third-party surety ar-
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rangement-if the issuer's contingent reimbursement right against
the debtor may become less than
fully secured and the letter of credit
may expire after payment of the

{VOL. 28 : 414 1996]

und~rlying debt without providing
for recourse against the issuer in the
event that the creditor-beneficiary
is required to disgorge the payment
as a voidable preference.
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